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 Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us. Our anger is a protest against 
a perceived mistreatment, and its function is to hold the person accountable for their offense. The 
anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that 
the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. Call this “reform” anger. A 
different sort of attitude, often contrasted with reform anger, is hatred. Hatred is also a response to a 
perceived mistreatment, and it also demands some sort of change. Unlike reform anger, however, its 
goal is not to repair the relationship. Instead, its goal is destruction, to remove the offending party.  
 In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a third sort of attitude, which I call “outrage” 
anger, that is distinct from both reform anger and hatred. I argue that outrage anger has an important 
role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. In §1, I 
introduce outrage anger, and contrast it with reform anger. In §2, drawing on the work of Maria 
Lugones, I develop an account of outrage anger as an attitude directed at the state of affairs in which 
a violation is not fully intelligible to the dominant moral community. I argue its central function is a 
kind of psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. 
In §3, I show that the benefits of outrage come with serious costs, both epistemic and prudential. In 







On January 18, 2015, in the early hours of the morning, two cyclists on the Stanford campus see 
a man on top of a motionless, half-naked woman behind a dumpster. The cyclists chase the man off 
of the woman and, when he tries to flee, hold him down until the police arrive. The woman, Chanel 
Miller, wakes up in the hospital with no memory of what has happened to her. She is sore, her hands 
are caked with blood, and she finds pine needles in her hair. She is only able to piece together the 
details of what happened ten days later when she reads about her own assault in a newspaper. She sees 
herself described as “the unconscious woman”, a nameless victim, while the man who assaulted her, 
Brock Turner, is described as a promising young athlete with dreams of making the Olympic trials 
(Miller, 2019).  
Turner pleads not guilty, and is eventually convicted on three felony sexual assault charges. He is 
given a remarkably lenient sentence of six months in prison with the judge explaining that a longer 
sentence would have a severe negative impact on Turner; in the end Turner only serves ninety days. 
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Throughout the trial, Chanel Miller faces overwhelming pressure to feel sorry for him, and to see him 
as the victim. And indeed, early in the trial, she shows a remarkable amount of empathy for Turner:  
 
I wanted accountability and punishment, but I also hoped he was getting better. I didn’t fight to 
end him, I fought to convert him to my side. I wanted him to understand, to acknowledge the 
harm his actions had caused and reform himself. (Miller, 2019, p. 91) 
 
She describes obsessively worrying about the pain he must be in, she tries to find out whether he has 
been seeing a therapist, and she acknowledges that she would feel responsible if he were to cause harm 
to himself or anyone else. A turning point for her is when she sees her sister take the stand, and comes 
to understand how much the defense is trying to build a case on which she is the responsible for her 
own assault:  
 
He knew there was a part of us that was self-conscious, the lingering voices that told us we 
 were wrong…He found it, hooked into it, injected it, grew it until the guilt was all-consuming. 
 Until we became so inundated with self-blame, so blinded by the pain, we lost the ability to see. 
 It was happening to her and it was happening to me, the two of us fed distorted realities, our 
 words twisted until we became uncertain, discredited, writing ourselves off as flawed and 
 broken. We willingly rammed our heads against the walls, confused, apologizing, unsure of 
 what right we had to speak. (Miller, 2019, p. 187) 
 
In her memoir, she describes in this moment being flooded with rage. She recognizes how much she 
has come to internalize guilt and blame for her own assault, and she resolves to resist the narrative 
that is being forced on her. When she eventually writes her now famous victim statement, she 
describes an anger so overwhelming she has difficulty typing: “I typed furiously until my fingers 
curled” and “I physically could not handle it, could not funnel my anger into the petty tap-tap of keys, 
could not worry about syntax when my body was breaking down” (Miller, 2019, p. 221).⁠ In the victim 
statement itself, she describes feeling an anger so intense she thought one of her organs might implode. 
The victim statement is addressed to Brock Turner, but she no longer displays any empathy for him. 
She is no longer interested in helping him understand what he has done, in having him apologize, 
repair the damage, or reform. Her statement is in the form of a systematic refusal of his narrative of 
the events. And, in the end, she makes clear the statement is ultimately for the sake of other victims 
of assault whose stories are not believed: “I hope that by speaking today, you absorbed a small amount 
of light, a small knowing that you can’t be silenced, a small satisfaction that justice was served” (Miller, 






I’m interested in Chanel Miller’s anger, and how it differs from the sort of anger most commonly 
valorized in political contexts, the sort of anger I will refer to as reform anger.1 Miller’s anger is not a 
demand for repair or reform. However, it is also not hatred. It is not an attempt to destroy the 
offending party. In fact, I will argue, Miller’s anger is not really at the offending party at all. Her anger 
is outrage anger: a kind of anger at the state of affairs in which the offense against her is unintelligible 
as the offense that it is. I’ll argue that outrage anger has an important role to play in the context of 
political injustice, and that it is often maligned because it is mistaken for reform anger.2 Before I defend 
this view, it will be helpful to have a fuller picture of reform anger by way of contrast.  
By reform anger, I have in mind the broadly Strawsonian view of anger as a reactive attitude. For 
Strawson (2003), emotions like anger are the fundamental way that we hold each other morally 
accountable; anger treats someone as capable of recognizing that they have done something wrong, 
and capable of reintegrating into the moral community.⁠3 As he argues, reactive attitudes like 
resentment are “essentially reactions to the quality of others’ will towards us, as manifested in their 
behavior: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern” and they “rest on, and reflect, an 
expectation, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part 
of other human beings towards ourselves; or at least on the expectation of, and demand for, an absence 
of the manifestation of active ill will or indifferent disregard” (pp. 8–9). To see someone as the 
appropriate target of a reactive attitude is to see them as responsible for meeting the expectations and 
demands of good will that constitute our relationships to each other. We can have reactive attitudes 
to someone we are directly involved in a relationship with, as a response to the quality of will they 
manifest to us, and in light of the expectations and demands appropriate to the relationship we have 
with them. We can also have reactive attitudes towards someone we are not directly interacting  with, 
in virtue of the quality of will they manifest towards someone else. All reactive attitude involve taking 
what Strawson called a “participant” stance towards others; they involve us taking ourselves to stand 
in moral community with one another, where our communal bonds are constituted by the demands 
and expectations we have of each other. As Wallace (2019) similarly argues, although anger can give 
rise to violent and aggressive behavior, “the core behavioral manifestation of this attitude is not so 
much the desire for payback as the inclination to confront the target person, to lodge protest against 
what that person has done, and to focus attention of both parties on the action protested as something 
that needs to be dealt with” (p. 542). 
 
1 For discussions of the political value of anger, see Bell (2009), Cherry (2018), (2019a), (2019b), Frye (1983), Leboeuf 
(2018), Lorde (1997), Jaggar (1989), Narayan (1988), Tessman (2005), Srinivasan (2018). For a discussion of the value of 
contempt, see Bell (2013). Bell’s view of contempt falls somewhere between what I call reform anger and hatred, but is 
not a second order attitude like outrage; its target is still the person who has committed a violation, not the broader 
hermeneutical space in which that violation is unintelligible. For Bell, contempt involves failing to see a person as living 
up to certain moral standards – as having a bad character – and it motivates withdrawal. Bell argues that contempt can 
sometimes be a fitting response to a person’s bad character, and can serve as a protest to a person’s character, 
motivating them to improve. Like reform anger, it involves holding someone accountable for their bad character, and 
can motivate change or reform. Unlike reform anger (and more like outrage anger), contempt involves a desire to 
withdraw from the abuser, rather than a desire to engage.  
2 In this paper, I will focus almost exclusively on anger in the face of political injustice. However, as with reform anger, 
outrage is possible in interpersonal conflicts. We can imagine outrage anger being appropriate, for example, in the 
context of a child trying to cut off a relationship with their abusive parents. Here, outrage equips the child to close off 
feelings of love or empathy in order to protect their own self-conception.  
3 For other discussions of reactive attitudes, see also Darwall (2006), Fischer (1999), Mason (2013), Wallace, (2019). 
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 This broadly Strawsonian view of anger as a reactive attitude has been more recently taken up by 
Myisha Cherry. Cherry (2019a), who is particularly interested in anger at racial injustice, defends the 
view that politically valuable anger is not only compatible with love for the abuser, but indeed, an 
expression of love. She argues that anger “expresses active concern for the moral improvement of 
those not only who are resistant to racial injustice, but also those who perpetuate it, or are complicit 
in it” (p. 165).⁠ This sort of anger is concerned not only with the treatment of those who are victims of 
injustice, but also with the moral well-being of the perpetrators of injustice. For Cherry, the kind of 
anger that is morally valuable is not concerned with destroying the abuser or making them suffer but, 
instead, wanting them to do better. She argues that moral anger at injustice is a form of criticism, and 
it is fundamentally constructive, not destructive: “it shows that the object of anger has work to do” 
(p. 165).⁠ 
 Even critics of anger like Nussbaum (2016) and Flanagan (2016) acknowledge a kind of anger, 
which they refer to as transitional anger and righteous indignation respectively, that is an important 
and apt response to injustice. And even Agnes Callard (2017), who is critical of what she describes as 
the “overly sanguine picture” of anger defended by others, defends a view of anger where anger is a 
response to the violation of the norms of a relationship, and seeks a return to the co-valuing of the 
relationship. For her, anger is not so much an attempt to repair a damaged relationship, but an 
expression of its being in need of repair. Once there is a shared understanding of the wrongdoing that 
occasioned the anger, it is possible to move past the anger, and return to a co-valuation of the 
relationship.  
 The similarity I want to emphasize in all these accounts is that anger is an expression of care 
for the abuser. Anger as a reactive attitude expresses seeing one another as members of a shared moral 
community or relationship, and seeks to demand some kind of repair or reform. To see anger as an 
expression of care is to contrast it with what Strawson (2003) describes as the “objective” stance. To 
view someone in this way is to view them as an object of social policy, or a subject of “treatment”. 
That is, it is to see them as something other than a full-fledged morally responsible agent; it is to see 
their behavior as in some way not reflecting the sort of poor quality of will that would justify 
resentment. Reactive attitudes, even when painful and scary, are a reflection of our continued care and 
investment in being in moral community with one another.  
We might think of the “reform anger” described above in terms of both its object and its function. 
The object of “reform anger” is the person or people who have committed some moral violation, and 
done so as an expression of a poor quality of will. Its function is to hold the abuser to account, and 
to demand that the injustice be addressed. Typically, this demand involves a call for the abuser to 
apologize, to repair the damage or relationship, and to reform. So, as Cherry (2019a) argues: 
 
If the object of moral anger is change, then anger is never just a call to ‘leave me alone’. More 
importantly, it asks ‘How might we live together?’ Moral anger at any political injustice sounds the 
alarm that a disruption in the community has occurred and expresses the need for repairing the 
damage. (p. 167)⁠ 
 
For these defenders of the political importance of anger, anger is criticizable when it is no longer 
consistent with benevolence towards the abuser.⁠ Baldwin (1998) criticizes anger when it is tied to hate, 
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and therefore incompatible with love. Lorde (1997) insists that while hatred “is the fury of those who 
do not share our goals and its object is death and destruction. Anger is the grief of distortion between 
peers, and its object is change” (p. 282).⁠ This sort of anger aims to eliminate the hated person, instead 
of aiming at reconciliation and change. Moreover, Cherry (2019a) argues, hate is not focused on 
understanding the abuser, and instead focuses only on the abuser’s negative actions, and “feeds off 
false information and ignores the person’s whole character” (p. 164). ⁠ This sort of anger is incompatible 
with any empathetic understanding of the abuser, and so also incompatible with change or 






Chanel Miller’s anger seems to differ from “reform anger” both in its object and its function. The 
rage Miller experiences is not, centrally, about the assault. Again, immediately after the incident, she is 
highly empathetic to Turner. She wants him to understand what he has done, and reform himself. 
Perhaps she is angry then too, but her anger takes on a new character during the experience of the 
trial as she watches her own narrative consistently dismissed, ignored, or undermined. She becomes 
angry, not at Turner, so much as that Turner cannot, and will not, understand what he has done. 
Indeed, the object of her subsequent anger is not really any particular person or set of people.  It is, 
instead, the entire system — the defense attorney, the probation offer, the judge, Turner’s family and 
friends, the media reporting — that privileges his narrative over hers, that allows women to be sexually 
assaulted without consequence, and that demands her erasure.  
Likewise, the function of her rage is not, principally, to demand that Turner apologize or reform. 
It becomes clear to her over the course of the trial that he is unlikely to ever understand what he has 
done. To the extent Miller cares about Turner being held to account, it is only as a symbol of 
something broader. What Miller cares about is helping to build a world in which the testimony of 
victims is not dismissed or undermined. Notice though that, although Miller’s anger is not the “reform 
anger” described by Cherry and others, it is also not indiscriminate hatred. On the one hand, its object 
is not the person who has harmed her, and its function is not to hold that person to account, to 
demand repair or reform. On the other hand,  it is also not merely aimed at revenge or destruction.  
To be better understand Miller’s anger, it is helpful to look at a distinction Maria Lugones draws 
between two kinds of anger.4 Lugones (2003) distinguishes between what she calls “first-order anger” 
and “second-order anger”. For her, first-order anger is anger that “has a communicative intent and 
does or does not succeed in getting ‘uptake’ within a particular world of sense” (p. 91) whereas second-
order anger presupposes “worlds of sense against which the anger constitutes an indictment or a 
rebellion, worlds of sense from which one needs to separate. These angers also presuppose or establish 
a need for, or begin to speak from within, separate worlds of sense. Separate, that is, from worlds of 
sense that deny intelligibility to the anger” (p. 89).⁠ Roughly, “first-order anger” is something like anger 
 
4 For discussion see Bailey (2018), Malatino (2019), and Medina (2020).  
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as a reactive attitude; it is a form of protest that demands acknowledgement of a harm done, and some 
kind of repair or reform. First-order anger seeks to communicate, or to make itself intelligible, to the 
offender. By contrast, second-order anger is anger that is appropriate in contexts where first-order 
anger is not intelligible. Second-order anger involves a kind of refusal to make itself intelligible in the 
dominant “world of sense”.  
Here, Lugones is drawing on Frye’s (1984) analysis of anger as an “instrument of cartography” 
(pp. 94–95) where anger can be instructive in part by showing us the domains in which our anger is 
intelligible. Frye explains that women’s anger is only treated as intelligible, or given uptake, within 
particular “worlds of sense”⁠. ⁠5  Lugones wants to suggest that first-order anger is the sort of anger that 
demands uptake or intelligibility within the “official” world of sense.  
Imagine a woman in a fairly progressive workplace who protests against sexual harassment from 
a co-worker. She recognizes that harassment is not consistent with the respect she deserves, and so 
she expresses anger, making a claim upon that respect. In Lugones’ framing, she inhabits a world of 
sense in which she makes sense to herself, in which she is respectable. But the “official” world of 
sense is one in which she is being denied this respect. If, in expressing her anger, she is believed, and 
the co-worker is disciplined or punished for his misbehavior, her anger is treated as intelligible; it is 
given uptake within the dominant world of sense. In fact, even if her complaint is treated with 
defensiveness, or disagreement about what respect involves, her anger is still being given uptake, 
treated as intelligible to the person to whom she is expressing it. If her boss, instead of immediately 
disciplining the co-worker, suggests that she mistook her co-workers friendliness for a sexual advance, 
her boss is still treating her complaint as intelligible. Her boss believes that, if she were being sexually 
harassed, this would be inappropriate. In succeeding in being given uptake, the woman is able to 
expand the scope in which her anger is intelligible, and to bring the “official” world of sense closer to 
the world she inhabits, in which she is respectable.  
However, Lugones (2003) notes, this first-order anger can pose a risk to the person expressing it:  
 
The demand for respectability can become a trap against inhabiting worlds of sense that are  
 entirely antagonistic to the social and collective scheme that determines the limits of the  
 intelligible, because from within them one may not be able to intend to present oneself as  
 respectable to others who are outside of these limits. (pp. 93–94) 
 
If the world in which a woman imagines herself to be respectable is entirely antagonistic to the 
“official” world of sense, Lugones thinks anger might turn to second-level anger. This anger contains 
the recognition that there is more than one world of sense. It does not make a claim upon respect in 
the “official” world of sense: instead, it “decries the sense of the world that erases it precisely since 
that world of sense stands in the way of its possibility. It recognizes this world’s walls. It pushes against 
them rather than making claims within them” (p. 93). This anger, which often takes the form of rage, 
is “a way of isolating her self, of making space for her self” (p. 95).  
 Imagine the woman described above, but now imagine that instead of her being met with 
defensiveness or disagreement, she is met with incredulity, or ridicule. Imagine, that is, that instead of 
 
5 We can understand a “world of sense” roughly as a kind of hermeneutical space. 
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her anger being given uptake, it is treated as ridiculous, or unintelligible. Instead of being told that she 
is overreacting, or that she misread the behavior towards her, imagine that she is treated like she is 
crazy for protesting the behavior at all, or for believing she might deserve a different kind of 
treatment.6 Here, Lugones seems to be suggesting, the world of sense in which this woman believes 
she is not merely an object for male sexual pleasure is antagonistic to the world of sense of the 
workplace environment, in which it appears ridiculous for her to protest her harassment. The woman 
cannot simultaneously inhabit both worlds: she cannot at once understand herself as being worthy of 
respect and seek to make herself intelligible to the world in which she is not given respect. She cannot, 
at once, make sense to herself and attempt to make herself intelligible to a world radically opposed. 
Second-order anger is a way of closing herself off to the official world of sense, refusing to try and 
make herself intelligible in this world.  
 Although, for Lugones, second-order anger does not aim to communicate within the established 
world of sense, it is also not devoid of communicative content. Lugones distinguishes between the 
communicative and non-communicative dimension of second-order anger. While it “decries” the 
dominant world of sense that “erases it”, it also “echoes or reverberates across worlds”. She goes on 
to explain:  
 
This anger speaks its sense within the official world of sense in enraged tones without the 
intention to make sense to those within it. Its harshness attests to the hardness of the walls 
against which it echoes. Its intimidating power indicates that it does echo. Its inspiring power 
indicates that it does echo. This is a separatist anger. (p. 93)  
 
For Lugones, second-order anger communicates across worlds through a kind of “emotional 
echoing”. As Medina (2020) puts it, this emotional echoing “calls upon us to recognize the failures of 
intelligibility within existing worlds of sense and to engage in the collaborative construction of new 
worlds of sense” (p. 225). In creating distance or estrangement between oneself and the dominant 
world of sense, second-order anger has an important constructive role. Lugones thinks it has the 
power to create new worlds of sense in which one does not find oneself unintelligible. Second-order 
anger then, has the power to create coalition or community. Lugones echoes Lorde’s (1996) idea that 
anger requires “peers meeting upon a common basis to examine difference, and to alter those 




 I want to suggest that Miller’s anger is the second-order anger that Lugones describes. This might 
not seem immediately obvious. After all, unlike in the case of workplace harassment described above, 
 
6 As Srinivasan (2018) notes, this response can be a rhetorical strategy to shift the explanatory context from the space of 
reasons to the space of causes: “The misogynist or racist explains away the woman or black person’s anger as a product of 
inferior character: she is only angry because she’s a shrill bitch; he’s only angry because he’s a thug. He interprets the 
question ‘why is this person angry?’ as a request for a causal explanation rather than a normative, justificatory one. And 
in so doing, he obscures the possibility that the woman or black persons’ anger is apt” (p. 7).  
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Miller isn’t ridiculed or treated as insane. In some sense, her testimony is believed. Few deny that she 
was harmed by Turner, and Turner is ultimately convicted of assault. That is, the dominant world of 
sense is one in which sexual assault is intelligible as a harm. It is a world of sense in which Turner 
should have known better, and is morally responsible for his behavior. Why, then, does Miller feel her 
pain is unintelligible?  
 What Miller experiences is a dominant world of sense that understands her assault, and the 
subsequent trial, in abstraction from patriarchy and rape culture. Her actions, and those of Turner, are 
understood outside of a context of unequal power dynamics. For example, Turner insists that Miller 
communicated her consent.  Even though no one in the trial denies that Turner penetrated her while 
she was unconscious, the incident is treated more like an unfortunate misunderstanding than 
predation. Throughout the trial, Miller is told both implicitly and explicitly that she is partly responsible 
for her assault, that she should not have been at the party, should not have been drunk, that her 
making these choices invited the encounter with Turner. What Turner interprets as consent is the fact 
that Miller at one point rubs his back: “The night after it happened, he said he thought I liked it 
because I rubbed his back. A back rub. Never mentioned me voicing consent, never mentioned us 
even speaking, a back rub.” (Miller, 2019, p. 345).  
 Miller’s assault is treated as an unfortunate misunderstanding because it takes place in a 
background context where women have a limited ability to meaningfully refuse sex, where the slightest 
gesture of  affection is treated as enthusiastic consent, and where any decision they make that increases 
their vulnerability to assault is understood as an invitation. Miller (2019) also lacks the ability to 
meaningfully advocate for herself  after the assault. As a woman, she is wary of being too assertive 
when she asks that Turner face consequences for his actions. Moreover, she is genuinely concerned 
that about Turner’s mental health after the assault, and the violence he might inflict on other women. 
She describes how the concern she expresses for Turner is taken as a reason to give him a lighter 
sentence:  
 
[A]s a woman I’d tried asserting my opinion without coming off  as self-serving or overcontrolling. 
So I repressed pissed-off  victim. Now I wondered if  I had handled it too gracefully, my composure 
a signal that what he’d done was of  little consequence. When I’d advocated for him to take classes 
and be in therapy, she mistook it as a nurturing passivity, gentle absolution. What I meant was take 
note of  his mental health, because in my experience, when men were upset, lonely, or neglected, 
we get killed. (pp. 218–219) 
 
Miller here describes an oppressive double bind.7 If  she is too assertive — if  she refuses to comply 
with the oppressive norm that women be endlessly gentle and forgiving — she will be dismissed as an 
angry, vindictive, victim. If  she is not assertive enough — if  she cooperates with the oppressive norm 
that women be endlessly  gentle and forgiving — her concern for Turner will be taken as absolution. 
No matter what she does, she cannot accomplish her goal of  having him be held properly accountable.  
 Miller (2019) experiences a similar gendered pressure at the sentencing.  Throughout the trial, she 
faces overwhelming pressure to feel sorry for Turner, to imagine what things feel like from his 
 
7 See Hirji (2021) for a discussion of “oppressive double binds”.  
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perspective, and to accept his frustration as contrition. At the sentencing, the judge implies that Miller 
is being unreasonable for not accepting Turner’s remorse as sincere:  
 
And so you have Mr. Turner expressing remorse, which I think, subjectively, is genuine, and Chanel 
not seeing that as a genuine expression of  remorse because he never says “I did this. I knew how 
drunk you were. I knew how out of  it were, and I did it anyway” and that — I don’t think that 
bridge will, probably, ever be crossed. (p. 234)⁠  
 
Like Miller, the judge recognizes that her perspective and that of  Turner’s will remain irreconcilable. 
However, the judge locates the problem in Miller, implying that she is failing to be appropriately 
compassionate and forgiving.  
 Part of  the irreconcilability of  their perspectives is that Turner’s behavior is also interpreted 
outside of  the context of  oppression and gendered power dynamics. Turner is understood by the 
judge as expressing genuine remorse for his actions. But as Miller points out, he never arrives at an 
understanding of  the action for which he is expressing remorse. Turner’s gesture of  taking 
accountability for his actions is to speak out against drinking culture and sexual promiscuity on college 
campuses. But for him to identify drinking culture and promiscuity as the background conditions that 
made the assault possible is for him to miss the gendered dynamics at play. What Turner or the judge 
don’t see is how normalized it is for men to go to college parties with the expectation they can have 
sex with drunk women, and face little consequence. As Turner himself  acknowledges, he went to the 
party with the intention of  finding a woman to have sex with, and attempted to kiss several women, 
including Miller’s younger sister, before he found Miller. The background conditions that made Miller’s 
assault so inevitable are not a culture of  promiscuity and college drinking, but rape culture.8 Indeed, 
at the sentencing, the judge reads a statement from a friend of  Turners that reflects how difficult it is 
for the dominant world of  sense to accommodate the idea that Miller was raped, or seriously violated:  
 
 I don’t think it’s fair to base the fate of  the next ten + years of  his life on the decision of  a girl 
who doesn’t remember anything but the amount she drank to press charges against him…This is 
completely different from a woman getting kidnapped and raped as she is walking to her car in a 
parking lot. That is a rapist. These are not rapists. These are idiot boys and girls having too much 
to drink and not being aware of  their surroundings and having clouded judgement. (p. 273) 
 
In some ways, what Miller encounters is more pernicious than the case I described above of  workplace 
harassment. Miller’s experience is of  being gaslit:9 she is, on the face of  it, believed. But the way her 
experience is understood is dramatically different from the reality of  her assault. The way her 
experience is understood takes what happens to her and distorts it, presenting her with a version of  
the events where she is responsible, where she should be more forgiving, where Turner’s pain is what 
 
8 See Hirsch & Khan (2020) for a detailed discussion of the conditions on college campuses that make sexual assault so 
likely and so prevalent.  
9 See Abramson (2014) and Dandelet (2021) for discussions of gaslighting. On Abramson’s account, gaslighting “aims to 
destroy the possibility of disagreement by so radically undermining another person that she has nowhere left to stand 
from which to disagree, and no standpoint from which her words might constitute genuine disagreement (p. 10).  
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gets centered.10 As she says in explaining why she decided to write her memoir, throughout the trial 
she felt “flattened, characterized, mislabeled, and vilified”,  she explains that the “saddest thing about 
these cases, beyond the crimes themselves, are the degrading things the victim begins to believe about 
her being” (Miller, 2019 pp. xi-xii).  
 Miller’s outrage then is a response to hermeneutical injustice, that is, the “injustice of  having some 
significant area of  one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to 
hermeneutical marginalization”.11 As Jenkins (2017) argues, there are three aspects of  this definition 
that are relevant to narratives around rape: the experience is significant, the experience is obscured 
from collective understanding, and the subject is hermeneutically marginalized (p. 197). The 
experience of  suffering sexual assault or rape is significant. It is also very often obscured from 
common understanding, and the very often even the victim is not in a position to understand their 
experience as rape. Finally, Jenkins (2017) notes, victims of  rape are “hermeneutically marginalized by 
the stigma associated with rape and abuse, including the tendency to blame the victims for their own 
rape or abuse” (p. 197). 
 It is worth emphasizing here that the failure of  the dominant moral community to fully understand 
the nature of  Miller’s experience is, in Medina’s (2013) language, a blameworthy hermeneutical 
ignorance. Tuner and the dominant moral community exhibit the epistemic vice of  actively avoiding 
external epistemic friction, and the resistance of  epistemic others (p. 56).12 As Medina (2013) argues, 
this active ignorance is “supported by psychological structures and social arrangements that prevent 
subjects from correcting misconceptions and acquiring knowledge because they would have to change 
so much of  themselves and their communities before they can start seeing things differently” (pp. 57-
58). For Medina, active ignorance is a form of  meta-ignorance, that involves inadequate second-order 
epistemic attitudes including vicious resistance to epistemic challenge. Individuals who exhibit this 
kind of  willful hermeneutical ignorance do not live up to their epistemic responsibilities in confronting 
epistemic friction or challenge. The abuser’s individual failing is embedded in a much broader 
economic, sociopolitical and cultural set of  patterns that keep members of  certain groups in 
subordinate epistemic positions: “the social imagination can, in this sense, be a negative epistemic 
force that silences subjects and renders certain things invisible, making it very difficult – and in the 
extreme case, impossible – for subjects to even register epistemic friction, much less handle it 








10 In Fricker’s language, there is an intelligibility deficit (Fricker, 2013).  
11 For a discussion of hermeneutical marginalization in the context of rape accusations, see Jenkins (2017), p. 197. 
12 See also Polhaus (2012) for a discussion of willful hermeneutical injustice which occurs when the dominantly situated 
knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed by the marginalized knowers, allowed the dominantly situated 
knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret or ignore parts of the world (Polhaus [2012]).  
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So far, I’ve described the circumstances in which first-order anger turns to second-order anger. 
Whereas the object of reform anger is the person who has caused an offense, the object of outrage 
anger is the state of affairs or the hermeneutical space that makes that offense unintelligible as the 
offense that it is.  Even though Miller’s testimony is believed, in some sense, her assault is not 
understood in the context of oppression and gendered power dynamics. She is reduced to a nameless 
victim who is partly responsible for her own assault.  
A note on terminology. In what follows, I will use generally use the term “outrage” rather than 
“second-order anger”. The term “second-order anger” is potentially misleading for my purposes, since 
a second-order state tends to have as part of its object some first-order state. Lugones argues that 
first-order anger turns into second-order anger under the appropriate conditions; that is, she suggests 
that second-order anger is always generated from first-order anger. As such, on her view, second-
order anger might always have as part of its object the first-order anger from which it originates. I am 
not committed to this however. It seems plausible to me that one could feel outrage anger without 
having felt reform anger first. The term “outrage anger” is itself potentially misleading, and should 
not be confused for what is sometimes referred to as “moral outrage”. Psychologists and philosophers 
sometimes talk about “moral outrage” as anger produced at the perceived violation of a moral 
standard, where this is sometimes contrasted with “personal anger”, which is anger produced when 
one is harmed. This distinction cuts across my distinction between reform and outrage anger; on my 
view, both reform and outrage anger can be felt either about a personal harm, or about a violation of 
a moral standard that does not directly harm oneself.13 Similarly, Cherry uses the term “rage” to refer 
to the Lordean anger that I have been treating as a paradigm case of reform anger, the sort of anger 
that, on Cherry’s view, is potentially powerful in fighting racial injustice (Cherry, 2021). These worries 
aside, and in the absence of a widely-shared taxonomy of different forms of anger, I think the term 
outrage here still best captures what I am after: a particularly intense form of anger that involves, in 
part, a refusal to accept the world as it is.14 
Turn now to the function of outrage anger. Again, Lugones argues that second-order anger 
functions to decry “the sense of the world that erases it” and that it “pushes against” that worlds walls 
“rather than making claims within them”; it is a way of “isolating her self, of making space for her 
self”. And, as Lugones argues, second-order anger makes sense in contexts where there is a serious 
risk to the person who tries to make a claim of respect in the world of sense in which her claim of 
respect is not intelligible.15  
 
13 See for example Crocket (2017), Batson et al, (2007), Hoffman (2000), O’Mara et al, (2011).  
14 I am not here intending to give a taxonomy of anger, and I want to remain neutral on whether there might be other 
forms of second-order anger, in addition to the kind Lugones describes.  
15 For related discussions of the political refusal to try and make oneself intelligible, see Bierria’s discussion of “alien 
agency”. On Bierria’s view, alien agentic action, action that is “opaque” to the dominant power structure, is a potentially 
subversive tool. Alien agentic action “does not seek to transform systemic conditions of oppression, but is resistant in 
that it facilitates action that is preoccupied with cultivating its own universe of meaning and practice that affirms that 
which is unvalued – in this case, black life – and is therefore ambivalent about or even encourages its illegibility within 
the dominant public sphere. Indeed illegibility can be leveraged as an advantage; remaining coded and strange to others 
can be a strategic benefit” (Bierria, 2014, p. 139-140). See also Glissant’s discussion of “the right to opacity”. On 
Glissant’s view, opacity can be a way to protect oneself from a demand for transparency that is potentially reductive: 
“But difference itself can still contrive to reduce things to the Transparent. If we examine the process of 
“understanding” people and ideas from the perspective of Western thought, we discover its basis is this requirement for 
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We can see this in Miller’s case. After the assault, Miller tries to make her pain understood, she 
tries to advocate for herself, and to bring Turner to justice. When she tries to make this claim of 
respect in the dominant world of sense, she is gaslit, made to feel doubt, shame and guilt. Miller 
describes anger as what protects her, and allows her to assert her own narrative, and to refuse the 
narrative of guilt and blame that is being forced on her. The function of her anger is to close herself 
off from the dominant world of sense, to refuse to try and make herself intelligible to Turner or others. 
Her anger functions as a kind of emotional boundary setting.  
Notice how this differs from reform anger. I suggested that reform anger is an expression of care 
— its function is to demand that an offense be acknowledged so that the relationship can be repaired. 
Second-order anger is not an attempt to repair the relationship, it is an attempt to remove oneself 
from the world of sense in which that relationship existed. We can think about this in the language of 
Strawsonian reactive attitudes. Reform anger, as a paradigmatic reactive attitude, is a temporary 
distancing that has as its ultimate goal that the offender be brought back into the moral community; 
even when the anger is painful or scary, it is a reflection of one’s continued investment in the 
relationship. By contrast, outrage anger is a kind of stepping out of the dominant moral community; 
it is a refusal to try to make a claim of respect within that community. 16 In fact, the attitude that Miller 
ultimately takes towards Turner is more like the objective stance than the participant stance.17 She sees 
him more as an object of social policy, the subject of “treatment”, than someone who can really come 
to see and reform his behavior. As Strawson (2003) notes, we might take the objective stance to 
someone when we seek to exit a moral relationship: such a stance can provide a strategic refuge from 
“the strains of involvement” in a relationship, and such a stance forbodes the relationship’s likely 
demise (p. 6). Notice however, that she takes this stance towards Turner only because, in some sense, 
she has already been pushed out of the dominant moral community. Insofar as the violation against 
her is treated as unintelligible as the violation it is, she is not given the same respect as Turner; she is 
not treated as an equal member of the dominant moral community. 
The main function of outrage then, is a kind of self-protection function. In Miller’s case, part of 
what this self-protection function seems to involve is blocking her ability to feel empathy for Turner. 
Not only does her empathy for Turner ultimately undermine the outcome she wants — the probation 
officer uses the empathy she expresses as justification for a trivial sentence — it also, more seriously, 
 
transparency. In order to understand and thus accept you, I have to measure your solidity with the ideal scale providing 
me with grounds to make comparisons, and, perhaps, judgements. I have to reduce.” (Glissant, 1997, pp. 189-190).  
16 Is it possible to feel outrage anger towards a particular person or only towards a system? For example, might we feel 
outrage anger at an anti-vaxxer whose entire belief system seems incoherent and who, as a result, puts other people at 
risk? On my view, outrage anger is unlikely to be warranted in cases where it is in response to a single individual, since a 
single individual’s world of sense is unlikely to threaten a victim’s self-conception. However, it might make sense to feel 
outrage anger towards a particular person (e.g. an anti-vaxxer) insofar as they reflect some broader world of sense (in this 
case, perhaps, one reinforced by political polarization and systematic misinformation).  
17 Of course, whether Miller’s attitude counts as taking something more like the objective stance depends in part on how 
one conceptualizes her moral community. We might think the appropriate moral community is something like the 
Kantian kingdom of ends, and that even her outrage is a kind of expression of care, insofar as it aims to realign the 
existing social world with the Kantian kingdom of ends. However, this sort of view makes it difficult to see how, as 
Strawson describes, one can ever really step outside of a relationship or community. Strawson seems to imagine one can 
find relief from the “strains of involvement” and I take this is what distinguishes the attitude Miller takes towards Turner 
from the attitude expressed in reform anger and other paradigmatic reactive attitudes.  
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begins to undermine her own self-conception. Her anger in part involves a refusal to engage with his 
narrative insofar as doing so undermines her ability to see herself in certain ways. What she learns over 
the course of the trial is that she cannot simultaneously believe that she deserves respect, and believe 
that she was seriously harmed, while also empathizing with his perspective according to which she is, 
in part, responsible for what happened because she was drunk, and according to which what happened 
to her was just an unfortunate but trivial mistake. 
Consider what empathy involves. Much of the recent work on empathy emphasizes, as a key 
feature of empathy, taking on another person’s perspective. Coplan (2011) describes empathy as  
“a complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another person’s situated 
psychological states [both cognitive and affective] while maintaining clear self-other differentiation” 
(p. 4).18 Coplan (2011) identifies three essential features of empathy: affective matching, where one 
takes on the same affective states as the target of empathy, other-oriented perspective taking, where 
the observer imagines the target’s situation, experiences and characteristics as though they were the 
target, and self-other differentiation, where the observer continuously represents themself as different 
from the target (p. 6). 
 Stueber (2006) defends a similar view, distinguishing between basic empathy, which allows us to 
recognize another person’s emotional states, and reenactive empathy, which allows a complex 
understanding of another person’s behavior via reenacting or imitating in our own mind the thought 
processes of another person. The latter allows us to see an individual’s complex social behavior as the 
behavior of a rational agent who acts for a reason (pp. 20-22). 
Bailey (2020) similarly takes as central to empathy the ability to imaginatively take up another 
person’s perspective, to feel their reasons as reasons:  
 
 To humanely understand another’s emotion is to have a first-hand appreciation of the emotion’s 
intelligibility. Securing that appreciation means imaginatively taking up the other’s first-personal 
perspective and seeing the world as calling for the emotional response that the other is 
experiencing. And this form of seeing achieved within the context of this imaginative effort, just 
is empathy itself. (pp. 8–9)⁠ 
 
L.A.Paul (2021) describes empathy of this sort as the cognitive analogue to visual representation; by 
imaginatively representing someone’s situation, their experiences, feelings and beliefs, you simulate 
their cognitive “point of view” or what it is like to be them (pp. 4-5). Doing this, Paul argues, allows 
you to “understand their point of view, in a way that explains their point of view”. However, Paul (2021) 
insists, empathy can have the potential to epistemically corrupt, especially in cases where there is no 
universal arbiter of truth: 
 
Opening yourself up to receiving a new kind of information or to assessing a new kind of potential 
evidence might be epistemically dangerous. If so, you might reasonably fear that what you need in 
 
18 See also Maibom (2020). 
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order to assess potential evidence could change you in a damaging way. In particular: it could 
corrupt you, changing your ability to make evidential assessments by your current lights. (p. 2) 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that empathy for Turner would come at the cost of Miller’s seeing herself as 
having deserved a better treatment: to have a first-hand appreciation of his frustration is to 
imaginatively take up his perspective, a perspective according to which she is being relentlessly cruel 
and uncompromising, trying to ruin his life for a stupid mistake for which she is in part responsible. 
This perspective, although part of the dominant hermeneutical space, is incompatible with seeing 
herself as she actually is, a victim of a serious violation who is subsequently pressured to blame herself. 
There is, in Lugones’ terms, too big a gap between the “official world of sense” — the misogynist 
culture that doubts and blames victims of sexual assault — and the “world of sense” in which she 
inhabits, one where her pain is an appropriate response to a serious moral harm.  
 Notice though, I am not suggesting that Turner does not deserve empathy. We might think that 
everyone deserves empathy. And, we might think that Turner is himself a product of misogyny, shaped 
by social forces that make it very difficult for him to appreciate what he has done. Indeed, to dismiss 
Turner as a mere anomaly, an evil actor, is to ignore how pervasive the sorts of beliefs and behaviors 
he exhibits are. And, to ignore this is to ignore the deeper, structural forces that make sexual assault 
so prevalent, and it is to ignore how damaging the effects of misogyny are on all genders.  I am not 
here saying that Turner is not responsible for what he does to Miller, nor that he should not be held 
responsible; we hold people responsible all the time for beliefs and behaviors that are largely the 
product of oppressive forces. But, this is compatible with thinking it is rationally permissible to feel 
empathy for him. After all, such empathy is compatible even with reform anger. I think the intuition 
many of us will have is that, although it might be reasonable for some people to have some empathy 
for Turner, Chanel Miller need not, and perhaps should not, feel empathy for him. 
 What I’m suggesting instead is that, even if Turner deserves some empathy, it might not be 
possible or healthy for Miller to feel it for him. It is better, with a view to protecting her own self-
conception, for Miller to be closed to Turner, and to any facts about Turner that might warrant 
empathy. Likewise, in the language of reactive attitudes, it is better for her to adopt the objective 
stance towards him even if, in some sense, the participant stance is more appropriate; he is morally 
responsible for his actions and was capable of acting other than he did.  
 Compare the function of outrage here with the function of forming a resolution in the face of 
weakness of will.19 A weak-willed academic might form a resolution not to go on social media for the 
day while she complete a referee report. This resolution involves an intention not to go on social 
media, combined with a second-order intention not to let that first-order intention be deflected. We 
are cognitively and emotionally limited beings, and in areas where we are weak-willed, it is often too 
exhausting, and too risky, to allow ourselves to continually reconsider our intentions. So too, I want 
to suggest, Miller is in a situation where she is confronted with her own cognitive and emotional 
limitations. The dominant hermeneutical space, and the persistent gas-lighting she experiences, 
functions in something like the way that weakness of will might. In the absence of a resolution, 
weakness of will forces the academic to constantly question her decision not to be on social media. So 
 
19 See, for example, Holton (2009).  
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also, in the absence of outrage, the dominant world of sense forces Miller to constantly question her 
own value, and whether she was significantly harmed by Turner.  
 Why, we might wonder, is outrage anger the functional equivalent of a resolution in this case? 
Why can’t Miller take on a different attitude, something more like apathetic withdrawal? Why isn’t it 
enough for her to understand the ways that patriarchy is operating, and refuse to engage? Again, unlike 
in cases where reform anger is appropriate, Miller is in a situation where there is very little possibility 
of her anger being given uptake, or treated as intelligible given the entrenched misogyny and victim-
blaming narratives in the community she finds herself in. In this context, a cool intellectual 
understanding that there is injustice isn’t enough because the ‘official’ world of sense the agent inhabits 
is one that tells her that her experience isn’t authoritative, that she is deluded or crazy or irrational. In 
a situation like hers, outrage anger might not just be a fitting response to the way the world is, it might 
be the agent’s only real path to trusting or really knowing what the world is like. The conviction that 
comes with her felt experience of anger, and the accompanying refusal to seriously consider the 
competing perspective, is what protects her self-conception. 
So much for the first, central function of outrage. There is also, I think, a second function of 
outrage anger that again maps onto Lugones’ account. Again, for Lugones, second order anger has a 
communicative intent across worlds, even though it does not have communicative intent within the 
official world of sense. For Lugones, second-order aims to speak across worlds, and plays a role in 
both self-creation and world creation outside of the dominant world of sense. In making space for 
new worlds, outrage functions to create solidarity amongst oppressed groups. Miller’s explicit aim in 
writing both her victim statement and her memoir is to assert her own narrative, in solidarity with 
other victims of sexual assault. As Lugones argues, while first order anger is backward looking, aiming 
at redress from harm, second order anger is forward looking, aiming to change what constitutes the 
official world of sense. Miller (2019) wants to expand the “space” in which her experience, and the 
experience of those like her, is intelligible, and she wants to separate this space from the distorting 
influence of the misogynist world in which Turner inhabits: “The statement had created a room, a 
place for survivors to step into and speak aloud their heaviest truths, to revisit the untouched parts of 
their past” (p. 252). Like reform anger, outrage anger is a “grief of distortion amongst peers” and is 
about change, but the change it aims at is not via an appeal to the wrongdoer, but instead, it is about 








So far, I have described outrage anger, and explained how it differs from reform anger, as well as 
from attitudes like hatred and apathetic withdrawal. Outrage anger is a second-order anger at the state 
of affairs in which the harm one has endured is not intelligible as the harm that it is. The function of 
outrage is, primarily, to distance oneself from the dominant world of sense. It is to close oneself off 
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from empathy for the abuser, and from the hermeneutical space that trivializes or undermines the 
character of the harm one has experienced. A second function, at least in political contexts, is to help 
build a new hermeneutical space in which one’s experience is intelligible, to create a sense of solidarity 
amongst victims of abuse. My hope in identifying “outrage anger”, and distinguishing it from the more 
commonly valorized “reform anger” has been to show that “outrage anger” has an important and 
distinct role to play in the context of political injustice. It is easy for outrage anger to come across as 
unreasonable or unconstructive, and even to be mistaken for hatred; after all, I have argued, it is not 
the sort of anger that aims at uptake or reform, and it is incompatible with love or empathy for the 
abuser.  
Consider other examples of outrage anger. When Black Lives Matter protestors damaged property 
in the wake of the shooting for George Floyd, we need not think of this action as an expression of 
reform anger, that is, as a way to draw the abuser’s attention to a violation and to demand repair or 
reform. Instead, we might think of this expression of anger as outrage: as an expression of refusal, the 
refusal to engage constructively with a system that treats the harm done to Black lives as insignificant 
or unintelligible. Consider also social media movements like “Me Too”. Much of the anger and 
frustration that women expressed during this movement was not to constructively engage with 
abusers, but instead, to harness women’s collective anger against a system that denies there is a 
persistent pattern of sexual abuse against women. This anger was constituted in part a refusal to have 
empathy for men who have enacted sexual violence against women. Consider too slogans like 
“ACAB”. Slogans like this are not a demand that police, or the police system, reform itself in light of 
criticisms. Instead, slogans like this, that involve a blanket condemnation of a group, constitute in part 
a refusal to treat cops as capable of the relevant kind of repair or reform; slogans like this condemn a 
system, not individual actors. What is relevantly similar in all of these cases is that the anger is not in 
the form of a classic Strawsonian reactive attitude. That is, the anger being expressed does not take a 
participant stance towards the abuser. Instead, the person feeling outrage occupies something like the 
objective stance: their anger is constituted in part by a refusal to treat the abuser as a member of the 
same moral community.  
This has all been by way of vindication of outrage anger. But, of course, I do not mean to offer a 
full-throated vindication of all outrage. Sometimes, outrage is not warranted. When protestors stormed 
the Capitol after the 2020 election, their outrage was not warranted; it was based on a false belief that 
the election had been wrongfully stolen. Sometimes, even when outrage has warrant, it is 
disproportionate to its object. When Natalie Wynn, the creator the popular Youtube channel 
ContraPoints, was flooded with death threats for featuring a controversial trans actor and filmmaker 
on an episode of her show, the outrage against her was arguably disproportionate to any harm that 
resulted from her choice.20  
But even aside from these sorts of cases — even when outrage is both warranted and 
proportionate — it is costly. In fact, I want to suggest, each of the positive functions of outrage is tied 
to some significant cost. The first function of outrage, that it protects the agent’s own self-conception 
against the dominant world of sense, is tied to an epistemic cost, namely that it is epistemically 




amongst victims, is tied to a potential political cost, specifically that it entrenches the behavior of 
abusers.  
Take the first function first. There is a long tradition of thinking of anger as epistemically 
clarifying.21 But, recall, the way that outrage anger works to preserve Miller’s self-conception is by 
blocking her ability to feel empathy for Turner. Once she starts to sympathetically imagine what things 
are like for Turner, she has difficulty, at the same time, maintaining the perspective that she is not to 
blame for what happened to her. Miller, in virtue of her rage, is able to see some things better, but 
only by limiting the sort of information she is taking in.  
In Miller’s case, this seems to be epistemically responsible: after all, she clearly is a victim of sexual 
assault, and is not blameworthy for what happens to her. The perspective she is able to maintain 
through her anger is truth-tracking, and Turner’s is not. But, it seems plausible to me that very often, 
outrage anger is epistemically clarifying in certain ways by being epistemically obscuring in other ways. 
In the case of Miller and Turner, matters are fairly clear cut: Turner committed an egregious offense, 
one for which he shows no real understanding or remorse. Even in the case of sexual harassment or 
assault however, matters are not always so simple. 
A common criticism of the “me too” movement is that it failed to discriminate carefully amongst 
different types of offenses.22 It lumped in serial rapists and horrific abuses of power alongside clumsy 
or unsuccessful communication around sexual boundaries. Part of the problem is that anger is a 
powerful weapon precisely because of what a dull instrumental it is. It is indiscriminate, incapable of 
nuance. Again, in the case of outrage anger, it functions precisely by closing off deliberation or 
consideration on behalf of the abuser. As we saw earlier, Cherry worries that hatred focuses only on 
the negative aspects of a person’s character, that it “feeds false information and ignores the person’s 
whole character”, and that it is incompatible with reconciliation and bringing the abuser back into the 
moral community. I think much of these worries hold for outrage anger. Not everyone who was called 
out and punished during the “me too” movement was like Turner, guilty of an egregious offense, and 
unwilling or unable to recognize what he’d done. Inevitably, some of the people who were called out 
in this moment were punished in a way disproportionate to what they had actually done, or the quality 
of their will. It would be naive to think there is no such collateral damage in movements driven by 
outrage anger. Indeed, as I suggested in the last section, even in the case of Turner, we might think 
some degree of empathy is warranted, the sort of empathy I’ve argued is incompatible with outrage 
anger. 
 There is also a worry about how outrage shapes our response to harms. Miller takes Turner’s 
light sentence as a symbol of the ways in which sexual assault is not treated as a serious crime by the 
legal system. Her assessment seems correct; the judge in her case seems more concerned with Turner’s 
well-being than her own. But the attention her victim statement draws to this issue is taken as an 
 
21 See Frye (1983), Narayan (1988) and Jaggar (1989).  
22 As Tolentino writes, “The Internet makes things more confusing: the world of sexual misconduct and confusion 
stands in front of us, exposed and quasi-litigated in new tweets and posts and essays every day…This is an 
unprecedented moment of flux on an impossibly complicated topic; this movement is not even three months old yet. 
The fact of a hashtag flattens these stories, makes them seem unified, but they are profoundly individual”. 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlash 
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argument to increase the mandatory minimum sentences in California.23 These laws are unlikely to 
seriously decrease sexual assault on college campuses, and are likely to disproportionately harm 
marginalized communities.24 Miller’s outrage is warranted, but the legal response to her outrage is 
likely detrimental to social justice outcomes.  
The worries about outrage I am describing here are borne out by the empirical research. Research 
has demonstrated the negative effects that anger can have on our reasoning processes, making us less 
likely to be sensitive to mitigating or exonerating evidence, more likely to blame third parties who are 
unrelated to the initial cause of anger, and more likely to act in punitive ways. The stronger the intensity 
anger, the higher the likelihood and severity of these responses.25 
Turn now to the second function. Again, I’ve argued that outrage anger can function to create 
solidarity amongst victims of an injustice. It does this by refusing to try and make itself intelligible to 
the abuser; outrage anger does not aim at uptake. Unlike reform anger, it is not principally about 
holding someone to account, having them understand their behavior and change. In fact, it is plausible 
that in many instances, it has the opposite effect. It is the sort of emotional response that, we can 
imagine, often entrenches the beliefs and behavior of the abuser. After all, it involves, in part, a refusal 
to see the abuser as part of the same moral community. It is, in part, a refusal to see them as capable 
of change or growth.  
Consider the disagreement over the last few years amongst Democrats about how to engage with 
Trump supporters. On the one hand, there were those who insisted that, without an appreciation of 
the political concerns of rural working-class white people, and constructive engagement with them, 
Democrats would undermine their own goals. On the other hand, there were those who expressed 
frustration at the expectation that their time and energy should be devoted to sympathetically engaging 
with people whose political and moral commitments were antithetical to their own. One way to think 
about this disagreement is in terms of a disagreement about what political outcome should matter 
more: changing the hearts and minds of Trump supporters, or the symbolic and material costs of 
making Trump supporters the center of moral concern (and whose moral concerns get displaced as a 
result). And, the assumption underlying this sort of disagreement is that the energy devoted to either 
group is a finite resource.  
The upshot is that, while outrage anger is likely to be productive with respect to one politically 
important outcome — the creation of solidarity amongst victims of injustice — it plausibly 
undermines a different politically important outcome, one that is the target of reform anger — 
constructively engaging with the perpetrators of injustice with the aim of having them change their 
behavior. Of course, whether it is worth constructively engaging with a perpetrator of abuse depends 
in part on their willingness to grow and confront epistemic challenge. As I suggested at the end of §2, 
the intelligibility deficit that exists between victims of abuse and the dominant moral community is 
very often the result of active ignorance, or willful hermeneutical ignorance. As such, I want to be 
clear that, even if there are epistemic costs to the victim closing herself off from the abuser’s 
 
23 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/books/chanel-miller-brock-turner-assault-stanford.html 
24 See Wodak (2018) for a discussion of the ethics of mandatory minimum sentencing.  
25 See Táíwò (2020) and Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) for a discussion of this literature. 
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perspective, it is ultimately as a result of the culpable epistemic failing of the abuser and the dominant 




I’ve argued that outrage anger allows for a kind of psychological boundary setting. The costs I 
described in the last section are the costs that come with this boundary setting: they are the costs of 
emotionally and epistemically closing yourself off to another person or to a moral community. A 
question that naturally arises, and a question that is much-discussed in conversations about political 
anger, is when the benefits of anger are worth the costs. One strategy to answer this question is to 
employ consequentialist reasoning, to weigh the positive outcomes against the negative ones, and to 
determine in any particular case, or type of case, whether outrage anger is on balance likely to produce 
better outcomes. A different strategy is to resist the idea that the value of outrage can be settled on 
purely instrumental grounds. For example, in talking about political anger more generally, Srinivasan 
(2018) argues that, in addition to the prudential reasons for and against political anger, we should 
consider the reasons of aptness, and the intrinsic value of feeling an emotion that is an appropriate 
evaluative response to one’s circumstance. Indeed, she argues, the conflict that members of oppressed 
groups feel between reasons of aptness for their anger, and prudential reasons against it, is itself a kind 
of injustice, affective injustice. 
I won’t weigh in directly on this debate. Instead, I want to point out how, in the case of outrage 
anger, even when there are prudential reasons that come into conflict with reasons of aptness, there 
are also always prudential reasons that align with reasons of aptness, and count in favor of apt outrage. 
What this means is that, even if the conflict Srinivasan describes often holds in the case of reform 
anger, it does not hold in the cases of warranted outrage. Again, I’ve argued that outrage is warranted 
in circumstances where the harm one has undergone is unintelligible in the dominant world of sense. 
Outrage anger is appropriate precisely in those cases where reform anger isn’t enough; it is appropriate 
in cases where there is no realistic chance of the anger being given uptake, and of there being a 
constructive path forward involving some kind of apology or repair. In these circumstances — in the 
circumstances in which outrage is apt — outrage is always playing an indispensable prudential role. 
As we saw, Miller’s outrage is necessary for her to protect her own self-conception against the 
dominant narrative.  Outrage anger is not just a fitting response to the way the world is, it is her only 
real path to trusting or really knowing what the world is like.  
The lesson I want to emphasize here is that what gives Miller’s outrage warrant is also what makes 
her outrage anger prudentially valuable for her. Srinivasan suggests that affective injustice occurs when 
an agent is faced with a conflict between self-preservation and living a full emotional life. The BLM 
protester should not have to choose between doing what will best protect his community, and 
appreciating at a felt level how unjust the world is. But, in cases where outrage anger is apt, this is not 
how the reasons divide. It is true that, in some sense, Miller’s anger might threaten her self-
preservation; after all, her outrage makes her the target of threats and abuse. But, her anger also plays 
a role in her self-preservation, specifically at the level of her conceiving of herself as having moral 
status. Her felt appreciation of the injustice against her is a matter of self-preservation, but at a 
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psychological not merely physical level. What this means is that, even if there are prudential reasons 
that count against outrage anger, there are also stronger prudential reasons that count in favor of it, 
reasons that are closely tied to what makes the outrage apt. The critic of anger insists that victims of 
injustice should give up their anger if it is counterproductive to the goal of resisting oppression. What 
I am suggesting is that, in cases like Miller’s, this advice misses the productive role that outrage anger 
plays even when it comes with serious costs: for Miller to resist misogyny more broadly, she first needs 
to resist her own internalized misogyny, to convince herself that she has been harmed, and that her 
pain matters. These prudential reasons take priority over the prudential reasons that count against her 
anger.  
So far, I have been focusing on the case of Miller because, I suspect, most of us will share the 
intuition that she is entitled to her outrage. She is the victim of a moral violation, in a hermeneutical 
space in which her sense that she has been violated is treated as unintelligible; in these conditions, her 
outrage serves as a mechanism for her own self-preservation at the level of her self-conception.26 
We might wonder at this point who else is entitled to outrage? After all, very often, when we feel 
outrage, we do so on behalf of others. Are we entitled, for example, to feel outrage on behalf of Miller? 
I think there are no easy answers here. If outrage is sometimes necessary to protect one’s self-
conception, and if it’s being necessary depends in part on what one’s hermeneutical space is like, and 
in part on what one’s emotional resources are like,27 there will not be a one size fits all answer. Not all 
outrage is warranted, and is perhaps especially clear in our current political moment, the costs of 
outrage are high. Given the costs of outrage, including to victims of oppression themselves, the bar 
for justified outrage should be high. However, there are also significant risks to policing outrage. Not 
everyone who feels entitled to outrage is in fact entitled to it, but making this judgement is often 
difficult from the outside. So, the bar for criticism of outrage should perhaps also be quite high. 
 One general principle I think holds is that proximity to injustice matters. A sexual assault survivor 
watching Miller’s trial is entitled to outrage. What the survivor witnesses is likely to threaten their self-
conception in the ways that the trial threatens Miller’s own self-conception. Miller’s experience is not 
unique to her; instead, it is a reflective of the dominant culture’s dismissal of the experiences of victims 
of sexual assault. Likewise, I think any woman witnessing Miller’s trial is entitled to some outrage. The 
dominant narrative, that Turner is the real victim, and that Miller invited her own assault, is predicated 
on thinking of women as objects for male sexual pleasure, and on thinking that when women protest 
their assault, they are being manipulative or lacking in compassion. It is reasonable for women feeling 
pressure to accept this narrative to channel outrage as a way to resist. In cases where one’s identity is 
bound up with the injustice that one is witnessing, outrage might be a necessary mechanism of self-
preservation.  
 
26 Although I have argued that outrage plays an important role in protecting Miller’s own self-conception, I don’t want 
to insist that it is absolutely necessary, or the only possible way for her to protect herself. It might be that there are other 
possible psychological mechanisms, including even varieties of reform anger, that could play a different but nonetheless 
useful role in protecting her. But, at least first personally, she seems to experience her own outrage as necessary, and I 
suspect this true in many such cases. All I have hoped to establish here is that it is one very important mechanism in 
protecting victims of injustice at a psychological level, and that we should be careful in how we criticize expressions of 
outrage in cases where there may be few other viable alternatives given the dominant hermeneutical space.  
27 Some people might have the emotional or epistemic resources to maintain their self-conception even when it is 
antagonistic to the dominant world of sense. 
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 There is however, also a lesson here about allyship. Sometimes, for some people, outrage is a 
necessary tool for self-preservation. However, outrage can come with serious costs, including to the 
victims of oppression themselves. When we see people express outrage at injustice, and when we see 
that their anger is warranted – when we share their sense that there is an injustice that needs to be 
rectified – it is tempting to feel outrage on their behalf. Again, anger is contagious. Moreover, it is 
natural to feel as though us feeling outrage is a kind of expression of solidarity. In cases where we do 
not need outrage to protect our own self-conception however, I think defaulting to outrage is a 
mistake. The hard work of emotional compression, and of constructive engagement with perpetrators 
of injustice, should fall to the people who do not need outrage for their own self-preservation.28 A 
similar lesson applies to people who feel wrongly targeted by the outrage felt by members of oppressed 
groups, but are sympathetic to the broader social justice cause that underlies the outrage. If you are 
cis man who hears women expressing indiscriminate anger at “all men”, it can feel alienating and 
frustrating. It can be tempting to respond by policing the outrage, encouraging a more nuanced or 
civil discussion, or reacting defensively. In cases where the outrage is playing an important role 
however, these may be the wrong impulses. Instead, the work of allyship might be to absorb some of 
this indiscriminate anger, to allow the victim’s pain to be centered, and to allow for the space to be 




28 See Táíwò (2020) for a discussion of the value of emotional compression.  
29 I am grateful to audiences at Queen’s University, Georgetown, University of York, Lafayette, University of 
Pennsylvania, and Villanova for very helpful discussions of this paper. In addition, I was greatly helped in the revising 
the paper by conversations with Meena Krishnamurthy, Thi Nguyen, Gabriel Shapiro, Jacob Stump, Olufemi Táíwò, and 
Joseph Earl Thomas, as well as the comments from two anonymous referees for Philosopher’s Imprint. I am especially 
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